Economic Development in Turkey Stabilizes: Banking Sector Reforms Make Progress by Alfred Steinherr & Joachim Volz
143 143
No. 3/2005
Economic Development in Turkey 
Stabilizes – Banking Sector 
Reforms Make Progress
Alfred Steinherr and Joachim Volz
The year 2004 saw Turkey take a big step forward to the European Union,
as international investors also believe, and in December last year the Euro-
pean Council opened up real prospects of entry for Turkey for the first time.
Agreement was also reached with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
on further support, chiefly to secure the servicing of public debt in the next
few years. The consequences of the serious financial crisis in 2001 now
seem to be largely overcome, although the inflation rate is still too high _
currently at around 9%. However, it is believed that Turkey may well fulfil
the Maastricht criteria for public budgets in the next two years. According
to the latest figures economic growth was around 9% last year, and strong
growth is expected this year as well.
This analysis takes a closer look at some of the important aspects of
Turkey's economic development in recent years and the state of the reforms
already carried out, particularly in the banking sector.1 It shows that the
Turkish economy is developing very satisfactorily _ compared with the
development in the most recent new EU member states as well, so at least in
the economic perspective Turkey's aim of coming close to EU membership
in the medium term does not appear to be unrealistic.
The macroeconomic background
Faced with permanent problems in foreign trade and payments the Turkish
Government endeavoured as early as the 1970s and 1980s to liberalize for-
eign trade and make the country more competitive in order to initiate more
export-oriented growth. However, despite the rapid reduction in trade
restrictions (customs duties, import quotas) and the introduction of convert-
ibility the inflow of foreign capital remained low. High deficits in the public
budgets, inflexibility in the economy under the powerful influence of the
1  The information on the Turkish banking system is chiefly based on a study by Alfred Stein-
herr, Ali Tukel and Muret Ucer: 'The Turkish Banking Sector', EU-Turkey Working Papers,
no. 4, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, August 2004.
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public sector, rising unemployment and persistently
high inflation, with consumer prices rising by around
70%, characterized the economic situation in Turkey
towards the end of the 1990s.
So from spring 1999 the Government endeavoured,
with financial support from the IMF, to reduce the infla-
tion rate quickly, restructure the public enterprise sector
and reorganize the public budgets. But the reform mea-
sures were only half-hearted and they were not gener-
ally accepted, so distrust of the Turkish currency rose
again rapidly, and despite exorbitant increases in inter-
est rates the exchange rate had to be floated in February
2001.
The ensuing second round of reforms proved more
successful. First the current account showed a favorable
development, then the reforms in the public sector made
rapid progress and the establishment of an independent
central bank strengthened confidence in the seriousness
and durability of the economic policy efforts. A contrib-
uting factor was the aim to reach social consensus to tie
prices and wage policy more strongly into the macroeco-
nomic development. One difficulty was the inability to
achieve a current account surplus over a continuous
period _ mainly owing to the persistent high deficits on
trade in goods. The central and eastern European coun-
tries became more interesting to foreign direct investors
than Turkey, as their attraction grew with the extensive
economic reforms after their political change, and with
their prospects of soon joining the EU. Turkey's rela-
tively poor performance was probably due to both the
hesitant privatization and its confusing and unreliable
bureaucracy.2
From crisis to effective reforms
The economic situation in Turkey has now stabilized
and normalized (cf. table 1). It proved possible to bring
the inflation rate back into single figures in the course of
last year _ to 9.3%, the lowest for nearly thirty years.
The price formation mechanisms have become more
Table 1
Key Data on the Economic Development in Turkey 1995 to 2005
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Gross domestic product 
(year-on-year change in %) 7.2 6.9 7.5 3.1 –4.7 7.4 –7.5 7.9 5.8 9.8 6.4
Private consumption 4.8 8.5 8.4 0.6 –2.6 6.2 –9.2 2.0 6.7 9.2 4.5
Public consumption 7.2 8.1 5.0 7.1 6.7 7.3 –8.7 5.3 –2.0 2.2 2.8
Fixed-asset investment  8.9 14.2 14.7 –3.7 –15.7 16.8 –31.5 –1.3 10.2 39.9 10.2
Exports 8.0 22.1 19.2 12.0 –7.1 19.1 7.4 11.2 16.0 14.5 13.9
Imports 29.4 20.8 22.3 2.3 –3.6 25.3 –24.8 16.0 26.8 27.0 12.1
Balance on current account
(in % of nominal GDP) –1.6 –1.3 –1.3 1.2 –1.0 –4.9 2.5 –0.8 –2.9 –5.2 –4.5
State revenue balance 
(as % of GDP) –4.1 –8.4 –8.2 –7.9 –10.1 –10.3 –15.7 –14.4 –11.4 –7.6 –5.9
State indebtedness 
(as % of nominal GDP) 40.8 49.7 48.0 48.2 49.5 93.7 85.8 82.8 74.8 70.4 76.8
Unemployment rate (%) 7.5 6.5 6.7 6.7 7.5 6.3 8.2 10.1 10.3 9.5 10.0
Consumer prices 
(year-on-year change in %) 89.1 80.4 85.7 84.6 64.9 54.9 54.4 45.0 25.3 10.7 8.6
Short-term interest rates (%) – – – – – 38.9 92.4 59.5 38.5 22.5 14.7
Long-term interest rates (%) – – – – – 37.7 99.6 63.5 44.1 24.2 16.5
Exchange rate 
(lira to US dollar) 45 738 81 281 151 595 260 473 418 984 624 325 1228 269 1512 342 1502 542 1437 340 1526 498
Sources: OECD; Deutsche Bank Research.
2  On the economic development in Turkey up to the early 1990s see
also the studies by Siegfried Schultz: 'Türkei: Stärkung der aussen-
wirtschaftlichen Flanke erforderlich', in: Wochenbericht des DIW Ber-
lin, no. 5/2002, and 'Turkey's Accession to the EU: Economic Criteria
Still Out of Reach', in: DIW Berlin Economic Bulletin, vol. 40, no. 7,
July 2003.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 13/2005  145
flexible, although high subsidies are still being paid for
social reasons, on energy prices, for example. Major
areas, especially agriculture, telecommunications and
energy, have already been clearly deregulated, and this
has brought considerable savings in state expenditure,
which in turn has improved the balances on the public
budgets.
The problems for regional policy, which are manifest
chiefly in the big economic gap to the east and southeast
of the country, have not yet been solved. The EU is giv-
ing financial assistance to the amount of several hun-
dred million euros a year, but Turkey still lacks the cor-
responding development concepts, nor can it make the
national contributions that are necessary.
The state of banking reform
A banking system that was inefficient and risk-prone
was the reason why the first stabilization programme
had to be terminated at the end of 1999 with new impo-
sitions by the IMF. Both the difficulties of stabilizing the
currency and the mismatch of maturities, particularly
for the liquidity of the banking system, made the Turk-
ish economy more vulnerable to crises, especially as
international financial flows were reoriented worldwide
after the boom of 2000 and the ensuing period of weak-
ness and crises. The central bank's efforts at inflation
targeting were bound to fail in view of the problems in
the banking sector. However, it was hardly possible to
develop a sound banking system with the high level of
public debt and inflation.
So getting the inflation rate down was also essential
to reform and stabilize the banking system. What is the
present state of reform?
The situation in the late 1990s was characterized
mainly by soft budget restrictions _ an attitude of 'live
and let live'. The Treasury was the biggest borrower
and the banks were the main lenders. With a chronic
lack of equity capital they funded chiefly abroad. The
share of domestic private bonds in relation to the gross
national product actually declined further in the second
half of the 1990s, falling to less than 20% in 2001 and
2002.
The IMF programme of 1999 was therefore also
designed to strengthen the banks' equity capital base.
An ambitious programme to restructure the Turkish
banking system was launched, with the aim of increas-
ing yields and utilizing these to improve the banks' cap-
ital. To secure the reforms externally not only were IMF
loans granted, the currency was also to be stabilized
flexibly, with possible shocks cushioned. So for up to 18
months a wider fluctuation margin was allowed. The
main item in the reforms themselves was the creation of
an independent agency to regulate and supervise the
banks. 
However, owing to the poor development in the econ-
omy as a whole this first set of reforms did not prove
successful. On the contrary, a massive injection of pub-
lic funds, amounting to around 35% of the 2001 GDP,
had to be given to consolidate the banking system (cf.
table 2). The Turkish banking crisis was thus one of the
most expensive in recent history. But it did result in con-
solidation of the banking sector, which emerged from
the crisis with modern structures that meet international
standards.
The chief measures were to restructure the state
banks and sell numerous private banks (the alternative
of allowing them to become insolvent was avoided as far
as possible, although this made the process more pro-
tracted). The remaining private banks were to have
more equity capital (cf. table 3) and better funding struc-
tures3 The regulatory and supervisory framework for
the banking sector was also to be improved.
The number of private commercial banks had fallen
to 18 by January 2004 and the remaining banks could be
regarded as largely stabilized, although some of them,
3  Under the Istanbul Agreement non-performing loans or bonds not
being serviced by private banks were to be taken out of the banks' bal-
ance sheets and replaced by funding assistance from international
institutions. But this only proved possible in part. Instead, in many
cases repayment terms were simply extended, so shifting the problems
into the future. 
Table 2






Costs to the Treasury 43.7 29.5
Restructuring the state banks 21.9 14.8
Costs of including private banks in the 
Savings and Deposits Insurance Fund 21.8 14.7
Costs to the private sector 9.5 6.4
Costs borne by the Savings and 
Deposits Insurance Fund 6.7 4.5
Supplementary equity paid by 
shareholders 2.8 1.9
Total 53.2 35.9
Sources: BRSA: Efforts to Strengthen the TBS after the IMAR Bank Episode,
Report by Ercan Turckan, Ankara, October 2003, quoted from Alfred Steinherr et
al., loc. cit., p. 5.146 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 13/2005
like the IMAR bank, still faced problems. However, the
loan risks that still remain in the banking system may
be taken to amount to at most 5% of GDP, and so they
are relatively low compared with the overall cost of the
consolidation as stated above. But compared with the
five CEE countries that joined the EU last year, the
Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hun-
gary, the Turkish banking system is still under-devel-
oped. Both the number of banks and the level of bank
assets in relation to GDP (around 60%) are relatively
low, while the share of banks owned by the state is rela-
tively high at around one third. The high share of public
bonds in the banks' portfolios is also striking, at around
44% in 2003 and as much as 80% for the state Halk-
bank.
Some success in restructuring the 
Turkish banking system
The real level of interest rates rose to 32% in 2002 fol-
lowing the crisis but it has now normalized as the econ-
omy has stabilized. In mid-2004 it was 12% and may
now be assumed to have fallen to less than 10%.
At the same time the composition of bank assets
changed and improved. The share of private consumer
loans rose strongly, while the share of public bonds fell.
Although there are no longer any official unconditional
guarantees for deposits in the state banking sector, the
impression among the general public is still widespread
that they do de facto still exist, and this disadvantages
the private banks to that extent. However, the state
banks have other disadvantages _ in the service area, for
example, and in innovation, so there are many demands
for the state banking sector to be reduced and limited to
core areas like support for the agricultural sector and
granting special loans for small and mid-size enter-
prises. However, the state banks would first have to
prove that they can withstand competition. Their
monopoly in granting loans to state enterprises and
foundations must be questioned. Their creditworthiness
must also be appraised in future, for many of their loans
were politically motivated and would hardly have been
given with a normal rating.4
Another problem the banking sector has to solve is
the heavy burden of taxes and charges, which in indi-
vidual cases can increase the costs of a loan in Turkish
currency by more than 50%.5 This is greatly hampering
the expansion of the volume of lending. It has also cost
the Turkish banks large amounts of deposits and loans,
which have gone to banks and financial institutions
abroad. In some cases this has also led to the establish-
ment of subsidiaries abroad by Turkish banks. At the
end of 2002 around 40% of bank loans, most of which
went to Turkish firms, had been obtained through for-
eign subsidiaries or foreign financial institutions.
In the private banking sector at least efficiency and
productivity now appear to be entirely comparable with
the EU standard. In 2003 the cost-yield relation of the
four largest banks was between 30% and 70% (EU
average around 61%). And productivity, measured for
instance by the relation of deposits to the number
Table 3
Risk Indicators for the Turkish Banking System
Non-performing loans Risk provision in % of non-performing loans
December 2001 December 2002 December 2003 December 2001 December 2002 December 2003
State banks 37.3 37.4 26.2 62.7 73.9 97.6
Private banks 27.6 8.9 6.5 31.5 53.0 80.0
Foreign banks 5.5 4.9 4.3 75.6 77.7 78.5
Investment banks 10.7 4.0 3.5 82.3 64.2 90.3
Banks controlled by the SDIF1 67.3 69.4 53.8 55.9 60.5 75.4
Total 29.3 17.6 11.5 47.1 64.2 88.5
1 Savings and Deposits Insurance Fund
Source: BRSA Annual Report 2003, quoted from Alfred Steinherr et al., loc. cit. p. 16.
4  Cf. Rauf Gönenc, Willi Leibfritz and Erdal Yilmaz: 'Reforming Tur-
key's public expenditure management', OECD Economics Department
Working Papers, no. 418, Paris 2005.
5  Alfred Steinherr et al., loc cit. p. 20.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 13/2005  147
employed, has also risen strongly in recent years,
although it is still clearly below the level of western
banking systems (about 42% of the productivity of the
US banking system, for example). Many financial mar-
ket services are still insufficiently developed, so that big
Turkish companies particularly prefer to use the ser-
vices of foreign banks.
In regard to future EU membership a comparison of
the activities of foreign banks in Turkey with their
activities in the new 5 CEE member states is of great
interest. Although access to the Turkish banking sector
has been largely liberalized in the last 25 years, foreign
banks only account for around 5% of the activities of
the banking sector as a whole. That is about the same as
the activities of foreign banks in Germany, but it is low
compared with the activities of foreign banks in the new
accession countries. However, the private banking sec-
tor had to be built up from scratch in the new accession
countries, and it was evident that foreign banks would
play a part as strategic investors right from the start.
The need for future reforms
The main requirements for the Turkish banking sector
to develop further are
–   Reducing the costs of banking transactions (lower
reserve requirements, harmonization of taxes and
charges with EU practices)
–   Greater transparency (consolidated balance sheets,
also on account of the numerous subsidiaries of
Turkish banks abroad)
–   A stronger capital market (the decision to transfer
supervision of the capital market from the Treasury
to the Banking Regulatory and Supervisory Agency
on 1 January 2005 is the right step towards making
the state more neutral)
–   Encouraging foreign investors to participate in the
process of further consolidating the banking system
–   Increasing lending to small and mid-size enterprises,
while developing appropriate supervisory functions,
and
–   Countering the impression that the state still has too
great an influence. It would certainly be disadvanta-
geous, for example, if in the privatization of Türk
Telekom, which is now being planned, the choice fell
on, of all possible candidates, the armed forces pen-
sion fund. It is under the Defence Ministry and
would hardly be able to guarantee independence of
the state.
Finally it must be asked whether the Turkish bank-
ing system will be able to fulfil the requirements of
Basel II by 2007. Higher equity capital requirements
pose similar problems for the Turkish banks as for
banks in other countries. One advantage, however,
would be that higher equity capital would make it easier
for the private banks to obtain a higher rating, where up
to now they have generally been at a disadvantage
against the state banks.
Turkey's macroeconomic performance is good at
present, and this should strengthen confidence in the
economy and ultimately also bring higher deposits into
the banks. Economic growth continues strong at around
9% a year, and the budget deficit is at its lowest since
2001. Only the development of the current account is
giving cause for concern, with the deficit almost dou-
bling last year from 2003 to reach more than 15 billion
US dollars.
Conclusion
If the state of reforms in Turkey, and particularly in the
banking system, is compared with that in the 5 CEE
countries ten years ago _ which is roughly the time hori-
zon for EU entry for Turkey, in the present view _ the
result is certainly positive. Most important is to reduce
the influence of the state further and ensure macroeco-
nomic stability, particularly in regard to foreign trade
and payments.
Above all the development since mid-2003 gives
grounds to hope that a new dynamic has entered foreign
direct investment in Turkey. The share index has
almost tripled and the exchange rate has been oscillat-
ing around the 0.70 US dollar mark per new Turkish lira
since 2001.6 Turkey's international rating has
improved,7 although at mostly BB it is still not satisfac-
tory, and long-term interest rates have nearly halved in
the last four years. Real interest rates are now about 8%,
after up to 40% in 2001. Turkey's central bank law is
largely accepted by the European central bank. If the
positive development of the reforms continues, and if
the desired soft landing for economy succeeds,8 little
should stand in the way of the planned commencement
of negotiations on EU entry as planned on 3 October
2005.
6  On 1 January 2005 the Turkish currency was converted from old to
new lira in the ratio of 1 000 000:1.
7  Cf. 'Türkei lockt internationales Kapital an', Handelsblatt, 18/19 Feb-
ruary 2005, p. 33.
8  The most recent surveys appear to confirm that, e.g. Nachrichten für
den Außenhandel of 10 March 2005: 'Industrie plant umfassende
Investitionen.'